The relationship between the individual jurist, the madhhab and scripture (Qur¾¨n and Sunnah) has long been a topic of debate among scholars of Islamic law. Based on a detailed fatw¨ on a controversial issue in tenth/sixteenth century Cairo, the present essay describes how, in the post-formative period, the madhhab mediated between the jurist and the sources. While clearly reflecting a commitment to taqlÂd, this fatw¨ renders problematic the attribution of such adjectives as ÒconservativeÓ or ÒservileÓ to that institution. At the same time, it clearly suggests that non-legal factors, such as the moral presuppositions and social outlook of the individual jurist, are operative in the processes of shaping school doctrine and crafting individual fatw¨s for Ôdifficult casesÕ.
relinquish the child. A bitter legal battle ensued, and unconvinced by Ted KramerÕs claim that the coupleÕs agreement constituted a permanent forfeiture of his ex-wifeÕs rights to custody, the judge ruled in favor of the former Mrs. Kramer.
In a recently published monograph, Kit¨b al-ib¨nah fÂ ×i½½at isq¨ß m¨ lam yajib min al-½a´¨nah, 1 the tenth/sixteenth century M¨likÂ judge and jurist, Badr al-DÂn al-Qar¨fÂ, takes up a controversy whose basic features are reminiscent of the Kramer case. This time, however, the problem is not mothers but fathers who renege on previously agreedupon child custody arrangements. In the opening segment of this work, al-Qar¨fÂ speaks of being inundated by questions involving men, who upon divorcing their wives, contractually agree (yushhidu ®al¨ nafsih) to allow their children to remain in the custody of their mothers, even if the mothers should remarry. 2 Upon learning, however, that their former spouses had in fact remarried, these men would return and petition for custody of their children-ignoring their initial agreements as well as the fact that these had been formally recognized and validated by a judge. 3 The reason for their change of heart was said to have been their fear that their childrenÕs welfare would be compromised by their former spousesÕ preoccupation with their new husbands. For their part, the mothers in question flatly refused to surrender the children, taking refuge in the previously ratified agreements. Al-Qar¨fÂ reports that impasses of this type had proliferated to annoying proportions (kathÂrat al-wuqâ®) . 4 His Kit¨b al-ib¨nah fÂ ×i½½at isq¨ß m¨ lam yajib min al½a´¨nah was a direct and detailed fatw¨ crafted with the intention of bringing this controversy to its knees.
Kit¨b al-ib¨nah appears to have been addressed exclusively to the M¨likÂ community of Cairo. In the introduction, al-Qar¨fÂ intimates that only M¨likÂ judges had suffered the indignity of having their rulings challenged or ignored. He notes further that the controversy over the legality of fathers reneging on such custody-agreements had divided M¨likÂ jurists into two camps. One group held that the fathers in question are not bound by their initial agreements, even if these had been formally recognized and ratified by a judge. The other group held that the fathers are absolutely bound, especially since the agreements had been confirmed by a judge. Al-Qar¨fÂ comes down on the side of the latter group, insisting that the fathers in question had no right to petition for custody of their children. En route to this conclusion, however, he would have to confront a number of doctrinal obstacles within the M¨likÂ school. His approach in this fatw¨ confirms what I have said elsewhere about the modus operandi of post-formative jurists operating under what I refer to as a r gime of taqlÂd. 5 Rather than return to scripture directly in an effort to effect new interpretations of the sources (what I argue elsewhere to be an exercise in ijtih¨d proper), 6 jurists respond to change and unforseen exigencies by invoking new divisions, exceptions, definitions and precedents within the body of school doctrine, out of which they are able to construct-as opposed to inventing-new conclusions whose conspicuous link with the views of established authorities from the past earn them acceptability within the school at large. Elsewhere I have referred to this process as Òlegal scaffoldingÓ. 7 As a post-formative jurist, al-Qar¨fÂ understood that his task was not as simple as proffering a new interpretation of the scriptural references to child-custody (and related issues), which his audience might recognize as valid on purely substantive grounds. Rather, he would have to reconcile his aims with the standing rules backed by the immovable authority of the M¨likÂ legal tradition. His movement, therefore, would not be from scripture to the question at hand but rather from the manuals of fiqh and other authoritative sources within his school to the question at hand. In other words, al-Qar¨fÂÕs movement would not be from Qur¾¨n, Sunnah and u×âl al-fiqh to the issue at hand but, rather, from already treated issues to the issue at hand, i.e., from furâ® to fatw¨. 8 Accordingly, over the entire span of Kit¨b al-ib¨nah-more than seventy pages of argument proper-he adduces not a single verse from the Qur¾¨n, not a single prophetic ½adÂth, nor a single argument based on the type of philological analytics developed under the discipline of u×âl al-fiqh. By contrast, he cites no less than twentyeight sources of M¨likÂ law (fiqh, not u×âl al-fiqh) and fifty-eight authorities within the M¨likÂ school. 5 ÊÊÊSee S.A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shih¨b al-DÂn al-Qar¨fÂ (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) , 73-101; idem, ÒTaqlÂd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory: Mußlaq and ®¤mm in the Jurisprudence of Shih¨b al-DÂn al-Qar¨fÂ, Ó Islamic Law and Society, 3:2 (1996) : 167-73. 6 ÊÊÊSee ÒTaqlÂd, Legal Scaffolding,Ó 167, nt. 10 The number of references to him in later M¨likÂ fiqh-works attests to his status as a jurist and to his contributions to the M¨likÂ legal tradition. 11 The present work, Kit¨b al-ib¨nah fÂ ×i½½at isq¨ß m¨ lam yajib min al-½a´¨nah, was completed in the year 975/1567, when al-Qar¨fÂ was about thirty-four years old (in lunar years, thirty-six). He died in the year 1008/1599 at the age of sixty-six (sixty-nine lunar). 12 
III.ÊÊThe Modus Operandi of the ÒPost-Formative R gime of TaqlÂdÓ
My use of the term Òpost-formativeÓ is a reference to the period in Muslim legal history that followed the so-called Òsettling down of the 9 ÊÊÊSee below. 10 ÊÊÊEd. A½mad al-ShitaywÂ (Beirut: D¨r al-Gharb al-Isl¨mÂ, 1403 /1993 schools of lawÓ (istiqr¨r al-madh¨hib) . 13 The precise date of this development, which conferred mutual recognition upon the four Sunni schools, remains a point of disagreement. N.J. Coulson was of the view that it occurred sometime around the end of the third/ninth century, 14 whereas J. Schacht held that the process did not reach its consummation until sometime around 700/1300. 15 Between these two extremes, a number of scholars point to the end of the fifth/eleventh century as the approximate date of the settling down of the four schools. This was the conclusion, for example, of G. Makdisi 16 and, more recently, of C. Melchert. 17 Makdisi observes that in his Þabaq¨t al-fuqah¨¾, which catalogues the names and school affiliations of jurists whose legal pronouncements are to be considered in making and precluding consensus, the fifth/eleventh century Sh¨fi®Â jurist, Abâ Is½¨q al-Shir¨zÂ (d. 476/1083) cites only the ¼anafÂ, M¨likÂ, Sh¨fi®Â, ¼anbalÂ, and ø¨hirÂ schools. The last member of the ø¨hirÂ school died in Baghd¨d in the year 475/1082, which permanently reduced the number of recognized SunnÂ schools to four. 18 On this evidence, by Òpost-formative,Ó I refer to the period beginning sometime around the end of the sixth/twelfth century, following the settling down of the madhhabs.
The net effect of the settling down of the madhhabs would go beyond the mere establishment of mutual recognition among the schools of law. In this new phase, the madhhab would soon replace the mujtahid as the primary 19 Ôunit of operationÕ in Islamic law. No longer was the unfettered and independent ijtih¨d of the individual mujtahid sufficient to confer authority upon an opinion (at least not among the community of jurists). Authority was now mediated through the endorsement of the association of jurisconsults as a whole, i.e., the madhhab. The madhhab now defined the parameters within which all interpretive activity took place. Moreover, no school, as a general rule, 13 ÊÊÊThis phrase is used by al- M¨wardÂ (d. 450/1058) looked to any higher authority, e.g., the consensus (ijm¨®) of the Community, to validate its views. Indeed, the madhab became in effect the highest legal authority in Islam, capable, in this capacity, of independently validating its own views.
Concommitantly, taqlÂd, which I regard as a cognate of the Common Law stare decisis, 20 emerges as the dominant hegemony. It is through taqlÂd that the madhhab was able to sustain itself and perpetuate school doctrine and jurists became bound to the strictures and operating rules of the Òr gime of taqlÂdÓ. By the time of al-Qar¨fÂ and Kit¨b al-ib¨nah, this modus operandi had been in operation for centuries and was fully constitutive of the status-quo.
The cumulative stock of a madhhab under the r gime of taqlÂd consisted of views attributed to the eponym or early authorities within the school and views that were extrapolated or deduced by subsequent generations ostensibly on the basis thereof. Because of disparity in narration on the authority of the early authorities and differences in the way in which subsequent scholars extrapolated from these views, there came to exist a multiplicity of views within a school. Not all of these, however, were of the same weight or status; some were more authoritative than others. These preferred views came under two primary designations: mashhâr and r¨ji½. 21 The mashhâr, generally speaking, implied numbers, i.e., the view that enjoyed the greatest recognition within a school. It was, for all intents and purposes, the Ògoing opinionÓ of the school at any given time, which all school members would have to recognize. The r¨ji½, meanwhile, was more a result of the individual juristÕs scrutiny, i.e., his choice as an individual of one of the views from among those competing for mashhâr status, or his considered opinion based on a 20 ÊÊÊWith a number of qualifications, of course, perhaps the most important being that jurists, not simply judges, represent the madhhab and determine the ÒprecedentÓ to which both jurists and judges are bound. It is also true that the object of the juristsÕ contemplation is largely doctrine rather than courtroom verdicts. Yet, the juristsÕ discussion of overturning judicial rulings on substantive grounds (naq´ al-½ukm) reveals the extent to which judges are bound by school ÔprecedentsÕ. Perhaps the propriety of equating taqlÂd with stare decisis could be taken up in greater detail in a later installment. 21 ÊÊÊSee Jackson, State, 83-9. Many other terms are used to designate these same two categories, e.g., al-mu®tamad, al-madhhab, ®alayhi al-fatw¨, al-ú¨hir, alma®mâl bihi, al-mukht¨r, al-×a½Â½, al-×aw¨b, al-aqw¨, al-aúhar, al-a½san. In his Radd al-mu½t¨r, 1:70, the ninteenthcentury ¼anafÂ jurist, Ibn ®¤bidÂn, says that where he finds a view of his predecessors to be lacking, he will simply cite his or another view, following the expression, Òso take note,Ó (faÕfham), which he says is more respectful. Cf., however, Mohammad Fadel, ÒThe Social Logic of TaqlÂd and the Rise of the Mukhta×ar, Islamic Law and Society, 3:2 (1996): 193-233. reconsideration of a matter in light of the primary sources (Qur¾¨n, Sunnah, etc.) . This practice of selecting and nominating views was commonly referred to as tarjÂ½.
The existence and function of these two categories underscores an important feature of the overall operation of the r gime of taqlÂd, namely, a certain tension that existed between the individual jurist and the association of jurisconsults as a whole. In terms of the skills and disciplines necessary to attain the rank of a recognized jurist, there was no decline between the standards invoked under the r gime of ijtih¨d and those recognized under the r gime of taqlÂd. In fact, the qualifications of a jurist under the r gime of taqlÂd were actually more stringent than those recognized by the early mujtahids. 22 Yet, when it came to professing his views on a particular legal issue, the post-formative jurist had now to recognize the mashhâr of the school at large. And where he found his view to be at variance with the going opinion, he had to find a way either to circumvent the incumbent view or to dislodge it, e.g., by arguing that some other view was more deserving of mashhâr status, or that more jurists had actually endorsed a competing view, or that there was in fact no Ògoing opinionÓ on this particular issue and that some other source (e.g., custom, ma×la½ah or judicial practice) was dispositive of the matter. 23 All of this came under the general rubric of the above-mentioned tarjÂ½. As we shall see, it was a common feature of the legal landscape in which al-Qar¨fÂ crafted his fatw¨.
IV.ÊÊSome Relevant Features of the M¨likÂ Law of Child-Custody
According to M¨likÂ law, 24 mothers have a preeminent right to custody of their children, males up to the time they reach puberty or acquire the ability to live on their own, females up to the time they marry. 25 . This selection of sources will provide us with a sense of the permanency of these rules within the M¨likÂ school over several centuries both before and after al-Qar¨fÂ.
25 ÊÊÊSee Sa½nân Mud., 2:244; 2:245; al-¼aßß¨b, Maw¨hib, 4:214; al-DusâqÂ, ¼¨shÂyat, 2:526. This contrasts the position of the ¼anafÂ school, which also applies even in the case of non-Muslim mothers of Muslim children, 26 though these mothers must not be known for trying to steer the children away from Islam, in which case Muslim ÔoverseersÕ are to be dispatched. 27 Fathers, meanwhile, remain financially responsible throughout the period of custody, 28 the going opinion (mutatis mutandis) even obliging them to reimburse mothers for the childÕs housing expenses. 29 Fathers have the right to visit their children and to be afforded sufficient access to ensure that the latter are disciplined and that they receive a proper education. And the motherÕs primary right to custody is preserved only as long as she and the father maintain their residence in the same city (or domicile). If either parent relocates (with the aim of changing his or her permanent residence) such that the distance between the child and the father would deny the father reasonable access to the child were the child to remain with the mother, the right of custody reverts to the father. 30 Both parents are subject to a number of general qualifications. For example, they cannot be mentally impaired, physically infirm, mute, blind or suffer from debilitating or infectious diseases. They must be able to provide a safe environment, especially for pubescent girls, and they must have a modicum of respect for the religious law, e.g., they cannot be known for drinking, adultery or illicit entertainment (lahw awards mothers primary custody but gives fathers automatic custody of boys at around the age of seven and girls at puberty. See, e.g., Ibn al-Hum¨m, Shar½ fat½ al-qadÂr, 9 vols. (Cairo: Mu×ßaf¨ al-B¨bÂ al-¼alabÂ, 1389/1970), 4:371; Ibn ®¤bidÂn, Radd al-mu½t¨r, 6:267-68. Based on my experience with Muslim communities in the U.S., it appears to be the common assumption that children make a choice between their mother and father when they reach the age of distinction (tamyÂz), usually set around seven years. This is consistent with the mu½arram). Finally, they must be financially responsible to the extent that the child would not be subject to unnecessary harm. 31 The sequential order of custodians does not run from mother to father. In the event that a mother should die or be disqualified for some other reason, custody of her child would pass to her mother (i.e., the childÕs maternal grandmother). 32 According to the Mudawwanah, after the maternal grandmother, custody passes to the childÕs maternal greatgrandmother, then the maternal aunt, the paternal grandmother and only then to the father. 33 Later M¨likÂ tradition would modify this order only by placing additional female intermediaries between the child and the father. By the time we get to al-DardÂr, in the eighteenth century, at least three additional female custodians have been interpolated between the maternal aunt and the father. 34 There were, of course, a number of possible exceptions to this order. For example, if a daughter reaches the age of marriage and her mother is either unwilling or unable to act in a way that ensures the girlÕs integrity, the father may assume custody. 35 Generally speaking, however, the M¨likÂ madhhab evinced a clear bias in favor of female relatives of a child. 36 This bias in favor of women finds its justification in the M¨likÂ insistence that tenderheartedness (½an¨n) and loving care (shafaqah) are primary considerations in child-custody cases. Since women are believed to possess these qualities to a degree far greater than do men, women are given primary consideration. 37 So central are tenderheartedness and loving care to the question of who gains custody of a child that al-DardÂr and al-DusâqÂ insist (apparently as the mashhâr opinion) that custodial fathers must be able to provide female 31 Maw¨hib, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] Shar½, ¼¨shiyat, . Cf. Esposito, Women, 37; ÒA woman loses custody of her child at any age if her behavior is immoral or if she gives the child poor careÓ. Such a statement gives the false impression that standards of morality and competence apply to women but not to men. Meanwhile, even in the ¼anafÂ madhhab, on which EspositoÕs study is based, men, including fathers, are subject to disqualification if the child is likely to suffer in their care. See, e.g., Ibn ®AbidÂn, Radd almu½t¨r, 6:270. 32 ÊÊÊThe above cited rule governing changes in domicile is an exception, albeit a rather awkward one.
33 ÊÊÊMud., 2:245. 34 2:257. 35 ÊÊÊMud., 2:244. 36 ÊÊÊThis is generally true of all the schools as regards the order of child custodians. It was only one (presumably weak) narration on the authority of A½mad b. ¼anbal that led an apparent minority within the ¼anbalÂ school to place the father directly after the mother. 10:118, 10:120. 37 ÊÊÊShar½, 2:529. According to al-DardÂr, ÒMen simply do not have the patience that women have when it comes to dealing with childrenÓ. Ibid. supervision, in the person of a wife, a sister or even a governess. 38 But a father had to be able to show that he could provide such supervision; otherwise he forfeited his right to custody.
By far the most important requirement placed on mothers (at least in the present context) had to do with their marital status. A divorced or widowed mother retained the right to custody only as long as she remained unmarried. If she remarried, she forfeited that right. 39 In the early period (still post-formative), the reason for this ban appears to have been the fear that the new husband would be negatively predisposed to the child. Ibn Rushd the Elder (d. 520/1126), for example, states that if the motherÕs new husband is related to the child (e.g., a cousin) her remarriage would not be a cause for her to forfeit custody. 40 The husbandÕs blood relationship to the child, in other words, is assumed to preempt any possibility of neglect or abuse on his part. Later sources, however, give the primary reason as being the fear that the child would suffer neglect due to the motherÕs preoccupation with her new husband. 41 They cite a number of impediments to the application of this rule, e.g., if the mother remarries someone related to the child, or if the child will not nurse at the breast of anyone other than the mother, or if the father (or other relative) waits longer than a year to claim his right to custody. 42 Barring such circumstances as these, this rule remained in force. Even if, subsequent to her new marriage, the mother is divorced or widowed, her right to custody is not reinstated. 43 M¨lik justified this latter rule by pointing out that the child would likely suffer from the instability inhering in the possibility of the mother remarrying and divorcing ad infinitum. 44 Later M¨likÂ sources appear to add little to this justification. This rule retained mashhâr status within the madhhab for the better part, if not the whole, of the premodern period. 45 38 ÊÊÊAl-DardÂr, Shar½, 2:529; al-DusâqÂ, ¼¨shiyah, 2:529. Though my focus has been on fathers (the issue with which al-Qar¨fÂ will be dealing), this stipulation applied to all male custodians, not just fathers. Al-Qar¨fÂ begins with the question of whether custody (½aqq al½a´¨nah) is a right that accrues to the mother (al-½¨´inah) or to the child (al-ma½´ân). The relevance of this question is at first blush difficult to detect, since, on either assumption, as al-Qar¨fÂ himself acknowledges, the child would end up with the mother. But al-Qar¨fÂ goes on to explain that some M¨likÂ authorities, e.g., Ibn al-M¨jishân (d. 212/827), reasoned that since custody is really the right of the child (not the mother), the father is obligated both to compensate the mother for caring for the child and to reimburse her for the childÕs housing expenses. 46 Now, al-Qar¨fÂ does not want to be identified with the full scope of Ibn al-M¨jishânÕs position-lest he be branded an advocate of exteme and irregular views. 47 But he does want to press the issue of reimbursement for housing expenses. To this end, he cites no less an authority than KhalÂl b. Is½¨q (author of the authoritative Mukhta×ar) to the effect that though the going opinion of the school was that custody is the right of the mother (as opposed to that of the child), it is also the going opinion that fathers are obligated to reimburse mothers for housing expenses. 48 Now, the point in all of this seems to me to be as follows. Fathers in tenth/sixteenth century Cairo, as a matter of custom-and probably out of ignorance-never reimbursed their exwives for their childrensÕ housing expenses. Al-Qar¨fÂ, however, wants al-Ra½m¨n al-MakhzâmÂ, Ibn Din¨r and Ibn AbÂ ¼¨zim. Ib¨nah, 83. 46 ÊÊÊAs stated above, the mashâr opinion in the M¨likÂ school, going all the way back to M¨lik, was that fathers are responsible for their childrensÕ housing expenses, later scholars generally arguing that such expenses are to be shared between the two parents (see, e.g., al-DardÂr, Shar½, 2:533). On the question of remunerating mothers for the actual care of the child, the majority held that they were not entitled to any money. See al-DardÂr, Shar½, 2:534; al-DusâqÂ, ¼¨shiyat, 2:534.
47 ÊÊÊ®Abd al-Malik Ibn al-M¨jishân was known to have held extreme and irregular views on a number of issues. For example, he held that a man could marry his daughter if she issued from an act of adultery or fornication (al-zin¨), because, according to him, she was legally not his daughter! See Abâ Bakr alKishn¨wÂ, Ashal al-mas¨lik shar½ irsh¨d al-s¨lik fÂ fiqh im¨m al-a¾immah m¨lik, 3 vols. (Cairo: ®Ás¨ al-¼alabÂ, n.d.), 2:78-79. This, incidentally, is also said to be the view of al-Sh¨fi®Â.
48 ÊÊÊIb¨nah, 39, 41. to remind them that there are grounds for holding them legally responsible for doing so and that, as such, they should not antagonize their former spouses-by threatening to take their children-lest the latter reciprocate with a demand for payment for housing expenses (which judge Badr al-DÂn al-Qar¨fÂ would duly recognize and enforce). In other words, al-Qar¨fÂÕs opening statement is a tacit appeal to the fathers in question to drop their petitions for custody of their children in exchange for their ex-wivesÕ non-pursuit of reimbursement for housing costs.
The fact that fathers-and apparently mothers as well-in tenth/ sixteenth century Cairo were unaware of their obligation to remunerate their ex-wives for housing their children raises some interesting questions about the effectiveness of the mechanisms relied upon for disseminating knowledge of the law in Muslim society. (We will see another instance of this in connection with the issue of the sequential order of custodians.) While a full treatment of such questions falls outside the scope of the present study, the fact that both mothers and fathers in this case appear to have been ignorant of this fundamental (and as it turns out, universally agreed upon [mujma® ®alayh]) provision raises an interesting point about the oft-debated issue of the disparity between the doctrine and practice of Islamic law. What we are reminded of in the present case is that while disparity between doctrine and practice can be the result of a societyÕs lack of commitment to applying the law it can also be due to a simple lack of education and the fact that knowledge of some of the more intricate details of the law is limited to specialists. The more sophisticated a legal system is, the more likely the latter is to be a factor contributing to disparity between doctrine and practice, especially in situations such as that of premodern Islam, where the intricacy and sophistication of the legal system far outstripped the scope and availability of general education. This is not to suggest that ignorance tells the whole story and that corruption, disregard for the law or psychological attachment to alien legal norms have no place in the discussion. It is to suggest, rather, that we be clear about what we are talking about when we speak of the disparity between doctrine and practice and that we consider all possible explanations for this phenomenon, which is by no means limited to Islamic law. 49 
b.ÊÊThe Legal Argument Proper
It bears reiterating that al-Qar¨fÂÕs strategy and manner of proceeding is comprehensible only in light of what has been said above about the modus operandi of the post-formative r gime of taqlÂd. Unlike modern legislative bodies that have the authority to abolish existing law, the Muslim jurist, particularly under the r gime of taqlÂd, had to contend with the putative fiction that existing law represented the eternal will of God. It is in the context of this reality that what I call Òlegal scaffoldingÓ takes on its ultimate value and significance. Al-Qar¨fÂÕs task is not as simple as re-interpreting the Qur®¨n and ½adÂth to the end of producing a law of child custody that is Ômore suitableÕ to the present circumstances. His task, rather, is to reconcile his position in the present dispute with the standing rules of the M¨likÂ madhhab, i.e., to cast his position in terms that highlight its genetic links to the M¨likÂ legal tradition. Only in this way is his position likely to gain the assent of the school at large, which, again, is the ultimate aim of the post-formative jurist.
Al-Qar¨fÂÕs approach can be summarized as follows: The position of his opponents rests on a legal precept (q¨®idah) governing premature forfeiture of contingent rights (isq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbih), which they claim enjoys mashhâr status within the M¨likÂ madhhab. Al-Qar¨fÂ wants first and foremost to establish that while the precept upon which his opponents base their position does have a legitimate claim to mashhâr status, it can claim only what I shall refer to as Òweak mashhâr-status,Ó i.e., as one among a number of competing views all of which have been supported by major authorities within the madhhab at various points in time. In other words, there is no consensus on this matter within the madhhab, and as such, mashhâr status remains open to an on-going competition. Now, the success of al-Qar¨fÂÕs campaign is clearly contingent upon how convincingly he can argue this point. His effort in this regard thus consumes upwards of fifty-six out of the seventy-seven pages of his fatw¨. In the end, having successfully reopened the question of what the mashhâr is, al-Qar¨fÂ introduces local custom and judicial practice as dispositive elements in support of his position. There are a few other side-issues taken up in support of his argument along the way. But this is the main thrust of al-Qar¨fÂÕs This is due, rather, to the fact that very few people know that the weekday curfew in Ann Arbor is 11:00 pm, whereas in Ypsilanti it is 10:15 pm! Youth from Ann Arbor routinely drive their cars between Ann Arbor and Ypsilanti on the assumption that the curfew is the same in both cities.
campaign, which leads to the following declaration near the end of the fatw¨:
In conclusion (al-kh¨timah), we may say in summary that custody is the right of the custodial parent [not the child], according to the going opinion (mashhâr) of the madhhab, and that [the bindingness of an agreement] to forfeit prematurely a contingent right is a matter of disagreement (mukhtalaf fih) [i.e., within the madhhab] and that the fatw¨ customarily given (alladhÂ ®alayhi Ôl-fatw¨) and the position customarily taken by the courts (al-®amal) regarding the question under review, namely, forfeiture by a potential custodian of his right to custody before that right accrues to him, is [that such forfeiture is] binding. 50
ÒIsq¨ß al-¼aqq Qabla WujâbihÓ
The above conclusion could be reached only after al-Qar¨fÂ had successfully confronted and overcome at least two doctrinal obstacles within the madhhab. The first, and by far the most formidable, was the aforementioned legal precept (q¨®idah) governing premature forfeiture of contingent (as opposed to vested) rights (isq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbih). According to this rule, a person could not forfeit or give away a right before that right had actually accrued to him. In the present case, this meant that the fathers in question are not bound by their initial agreements because these agreements entailed the forfeiture of rights that were contingent upon occurences that have not yet transpired. In other words, the fatherÕs right to custody is contingent upon his former wifeÕs remarriage, which had not yet occured at the time he agreed to forego custody. As such, the right to forfeiture had not yet accrued to him and it was thus not his to give away. This rendered any such act of forfeiture on his part null and void. This was the argument adduced by al-Qar¨fÂÕs opponents, a position bolstered by the fact that a number of prominent, near contemporary leaders within the madhhab had endorsed this view as the mashhâr. 51 Part of al-Qar¨fÂÕs problem resided in the fact that the legal precept, isq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbih, initially had been invoked in support of mothers in child-custody disputes. In his commentary on Mukhta×ar khalÂl, al-Qar¨fÂÕs older contemporary, Mu½ammad al-¼aßß¨b (d. 953/ 1547), cites this precept as the basis for demanding that a womanÕs children be returned to her in cases of khul®, if her husband had demanded custody as a partial payment in exchange for releasing her from their marriage. Since, the argument ran, custody was not the motherÕs right to forfeit while the couple were still married, this forfeiture was not enforceable after the couple had parted. 52 Now, however, circumstances had changed, and the consistent application of this once Ôfemale-friendlyÕ precept was yielding results detrimental to women. Indeed, this same precept was being invoked to deny mothers the right to retain prematurely forfeited custody of their children. In order to succeed in his mission, al-Qar¨fÂ would have to find a way around this precept (or at least his opponentsÕ application of it) without giving the appearance of going against the tradition of his school.
2.ÊÊConfronting the Claimed Mashhâr of the Madhhab
Al-Qar¨fiÕs first order of business was to confront his opponentsÕ claim regarding the proper application of the rule governing premature forfeiture of contingent rights. He prefaces his campaign by acknowledging that the question under review falls within the scope of this precept. He cites several well-known questions (mas¨¾il/sg. mas¾alah) in the madhhab that have been treated under its provisions. Then, in order to preempt any charges that he is a maverick who is not reading from the same sheet as everyone else, he quotes the text of a mnemonic ÔpoemÕ by the ninth/fifteenth century M¨likÂ jurist, Abâ Bakr al-Dam¨-mÂnÂ (d. 827/1425). Al-Dam¨mÂnÂÕs poem represents an important genre 53 about which I am not prepared to say much beyond the suggestion that these ÔpoemsÕ were used as school-texts that students memorized on their way to becoming jurists. They could be written by a master 54 or by some lesser jurisconsult within the school and then ratified by a master. Once completed, however, these mnemonic poems appear to have served the dual function of: (1) settling inter-school disagreement; and (2) providing students with an easy tool for memorizing what had become the mashhâr or school doctrine as a result of the cumulative discourse within the madhhab. These pr cis would be updated from time to time, as old mashhârs were displaced by new ones. But until such time that a master (or a proteg ) took up the task of revision, an incumbent poem would generally be assumed to carry the weight of school-doctrine and reflected the views to which all school members would be expected to pay homage. Now, al-Dam¨mÂnÂÕs poem included the acknowledgment that there was disagreement within the madhhab over the precise application of the rule governing premature forfeiture of contingent rights, some rights being generally recognized as being forfeitable even before they accrued. 55 It had been al-Dam¨mÂnÂÕs intent, however, to resolve this disagreement and to establish what was to be accepted as the going opinion of the school. To this end his poem included a list of all those instances in which forfeiture prior to maturity was not enforceable. The ninth line of his poem reads:
The forfeiter of the right of custody before it accrues This is the ruling [i.e., that it is not enforceable] so beware of the claims of prevaricators (wa musqißu ½aqqin liÕl-½a´¨nati lam yajib; kadh¨ ½ukmuhu faÕ½dhar maq¨lata ¨fik) 56 Al-Qar¨fÂ cited al-Dam¨mÂnÂÕs poem on the authority of Mu½ammad b. Ibr¨hÂm al-Tat¨¾Â, himself a chief judge who died in the year 942/1535. Not only had al-Tat¨¾Â been a leading authority in the M¨likÂ school but his proximity to al-Qar¨fÂÕs generation made it virtually impossible to ignore his endorsement. Al-Qar¨fÂÕs locution intimates that he perceived al-Tat¨i¾Â to be a far greater threat than al-Dam¨mÂnÂ, a fact most prominently reflected in some of the rather irreverent criticisms he directs towards al-Tat¨¾Â. 57 Part of the reason behind this attitude towards alTat¨¾Â appears to be that, in addition to citing al-Dam¨mÂnÂÕs poem in support of the view that premature forfeiture of contingent custodyrights was unenforceable, al-Tat¨¾Â had cited another poem on the authority of another M¨likÂ jurist, Jam¨l al-DÂn al-AqfahsÂ (d. 823/1420), which al-Tat¨¾Â claimed was the definitive summation of the position of the M¨likÂ school at large. This connoted an ersatz unanimity that further complicated matters for al-Qar¨fÂ. In al-Tat¨¾ÂÕs poem we read the following:
The going opinion regarding all of these questions Is that premature forfeiture is not enforceable, so take the position of M¨lik (®al¨ anna mashhâr al-mas¨¾ili kullihs uqâßu luzâmin fa®tamid qawla M¨lik) Al-Tat¨¾Â had been a towering figure within the M¨likÂ school. Through the likes of him, al-Dam¨mÂnÂ and al-AqfahsÂ, the cumulative position of the M¨likÂ madhhab on the correct application of the rule governing premature forfeiture of contingent rights had crystalized into a veritable consensus that would provide al-Qar¨fÂÕs opponents with a solid basis for denying the mothers in the present dispute the right to retain custody of their children. The view of his opponents was clearly incumbent, and it carried the immoveable authority of the madhhab at large. It was here, in the face of this formidable reality, that al-Qar¨fÂ would have to dig in and mount his counter-offensive. He proceeded by first disassembling the position of the madhhab and then reconstructing a new position, which he fortified through vertical and horizontal appeals to other recognized sources and authorities within the madhhab.
3.ÊÊAl-Qar¨fÂÕs Counter
Al-Qar¨fÂ began his counter-offensive by insisting that the position of al-AqfahsÂ and al-Tat¨¾Â was an overgeneralization that failed to take into account known exceptions to the general application of the rule on premature forfeiture of contingent rights. Pursuant to proving this charge, he catalogues, in verse and then commentary, some thirty questions in the M¨likÂ school on which there is standing disagreement over the application of this rule, or on which the mashhâr is actually that premature forfeiture of a contingent right is enforceable. AlQar¨fÂÕs list includes the following: 1.ÊÊa relative forfeiting the right to preemption (shuf®ah) before the actual sale 2.ÊÊan heir forfeiting the right to inheritance while the testator is still alive 3.ÊÊimplementing a testatorÕs bequest (wa×Âyah) while the latter is still alive 4.ÊÊa testator making a deathbed bequest with the other heirsÕ permission 5.ÊÊa wife giving up days to a co-wife 6.ÊÊa female slave declaring (prior to manumission) whether upon manumission she will remain with her present husband 7.ÊÊa man stating to his wife: If I take an additional wife, you may choose to stay or not 8.ÊÊforfeiting the right to custody before it matures 9.ÊÊa personÕs stating to another: If you kill me, you are pardoned 10.ÊÊa wife forfeiting her right to future maintenance by her husband 11.ÊÊa woman forfeiting her bride-price before consummating the marriage 12.ÊÊa person pardoning another for inflicting wounds before they are inflicted 13.ÊÊsetting aside one among a number of conditions mentioned in a contract 14.ÊÊa wife reversing absolution of her husbandÕs promise not to marry without her permission 15.ÊÊa testator going back on a bequest (wa×Âyah) before dying 16.ÊÊrefusing a bequest during a testatorÕs life and then returning to claim it after his death 17.ÊÊa blood-relative pardoning a (potential) murderer before the actual murder 18.ÊÊpardoning a slanderer (q¨dhif) before he actually slanders 19.ÊÊexpiating for broken oaths before they are actually broken 20.ÊÊpaying obligatory alms before the completion of the full-year cycle (½awl) 21.ÊÊa buyer or debtor relieving a seller or creditor of taking oaths in court in the event of a dispute 22.ÊÊa master freeing a slave-girl on the condition that she marry him 23.ÊÊa buyer forfeiting warranty rights at time of sale 24.ÊÊa buyer forfeiting Òacts of God (j¨¾i½ah)Ó liability protection at time of contract 25.ÊÊa buyer forfeiting the right to a three-day warranty (on slaves) 26.ÊÊa creditor delaying acceptance of payment by a guarantor (kafÂl) 27.ÊÊa creditor refusing liability for collateral left in his possession 28.ÊÊa borrower (e.g., of utensils) refusing to accept liability for them 29.ÊÊa craftsman refusing to accept liability for goods left in his possession 30.ÊÊa transporter insisting on being absolved of liability before delivery All of these examples bear on the issue of forfeiting contingent rights before they have accrued. Take, for example, #29. A craftsmanÕs (×¨ni®) refusal at the time of contract to accept liability for a good left in his possession entails the property ownerÕs forfeiture of the right to liability protection before that right has accrued to him. Under M¨likÂ law, craftsmen are bound by an implicit, automatic stipulation of liability for any damage to goods left in their possession. A customer may forfeit this right after any damage has occurred and after he has accepted the original right to liability protection as an implied warranty inherent in the contract. But whether he can forfeit that right before such time was a point of disagreement, clearly indicating that there had been different constructions of the precept, Òisq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbihÓ.
Again, al-Qar¨fÂÕs aim in citing these examples was to free his audience from the clutches of the claim by al-Tat¨¾Â, al-AqfahsÂ and alDam¨mÂnÂ to the effect that the mashhâr of the madhhab supported the position of the fathers in the present dispute. The first nine of these entries are actually taken from the poem of al-Dam¨mÂni. In the case of all nine, al-Qar¨fÂ adduces evidence to prove that there was a standing disagreement (khil¨f) within the madhhab. The next four examples (#10 through #13) are from the poem by al-Tat¨¾Â. Here too al-Qar¨fÂ provides evidence to the effect that every single one of these questions was a point of disagreement. The remaining seventeen specimens (#14 through #30) are all al-Qar¨fÂÕs own. Here, however, his aim is to move beyond the simple claim that there is disagreement in the madhhab to establish the fact that in a significant number of cases the madhhab actually holds premature forfeiture to be both binding and enforceable. Interestingly, none of al-Qar¨fÂÕs specimens (#14 through #30) are claimed to be the object of school-consensus. Some of these questions apparently generated very little discussion within the madhhab and are thus disposed of in just a few lines. 58 The majority, however, were vigorously disputed, and al-Qar¨fÂ is forced to make a substantial investment in tarjÂ½ (declaring a view to be r¨ji½) in order to advantage the view that recognizes premature forfeiture.
In executing his tarjÂ½, al-Qar¨fÂ shows himself to be a clever and hard-nosed advocate who understands not only the legal but also the psychological dimensions of his craft. In a number of these examples, he argues his point via the tacit proposition that if one wishes to hold to a strict prohibition of all acts of premature forfeiture of contingent rights, one will have to relinquish a number of valuable options that one presently enjoys. Some of these options are sensitive and emotionally charged. Indeed, one gets the sense that this appeal to emotion and personal interest was integral to al-Qar¨fÂÕs strategy overall.
The clearest example of al-Qar¨fÂÕs two-pronged, legal-psychological approach is the fourteenth and longest of his thirty specimens. This example treats the matter of a man who has included in his marriage contract a stipulation (sharß) to the effect that if he takes an additional wife, his present wife has the right to initiate a divorce. At some point, however, prior to his taking an additional wife, his present wife voluntarily forfeits her contingent right to divorce. When, subsequently, her husband actually takes an additional wife, the question arises whether the first wife can revoke her earlier forfeiture and return to the original stipulation that empowered her to terminate the marriage. Now, this question falls under the same precept as the question of husbands going back on their child-custody agreements. In this case, the womanÕs right to terminate the marriage does not accrue to her until her husband actually takes on an additional wife. Therefore, her forfeiture of that right prior to his additional marriage constitutes a case of isq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbih. Now, as far as the legal issue goes, alQar¨fÂ indicates that this question had been disputed (mukhtalaf fih) within the madhhab, several early authorities, e.g., Ashhab, Ibn ¼abÂb and Sa½nân upholding the womanÕs right to go back on her initial act of forfeiture. 59 This I take, however, to be little more than a scare-tactic on al-Qar¨fÂÕs part designed to send the message that if he wants to uphold the womanÕs right to initiate divorce, there is ample precedent in the madhhab to support him. The opposite opinion, however, was supported by the likes of M¨lik, Ibn al-Q¨sim, al-MutayyißÂ (d. 570/1174 ), Ibn ®Arafah (d. 803/1401 and Ibn Rushd the Elder, all of whom held that the woman was bound by her act of forfeiture. 60 This latter position was also adopted by the elder contemporary, the great N¨×ir al-DÂn al-Laqq¨nÂ (d. 958/1551), whose status among contemporary M¨likÂ jurists is reflected in al-Qar¨fÂÕs reference to him as Òshaykh shuyâkhin¨ (the teacher of our teachers)Ó. 61 Al-Laqq¨nÂÕs endorsement, along with that of M¨lik, Ibn al-Q¨sim and those who joined them, would make clean work of al-Qar¨fÂÕs effort to sustain this position as the mashhâr (which is why I say that his citing the first position was merely a scare-tactic). On another level, however, it could hardly be lost on al-Qar¨fÂ that most men in his society, given their concupiscible interests, would be inclined to hold the woman in question to her act of 59 ÊÊÊIbid., [59] [60] ÊÊÊIbid., [60] [61] ÊÊÊIbid., 60. forfeiture, which would deny her the right to terminate her marriage in the event that her husband took on an additional wife. In order to do this, however, these men would have to endorse the position that at least some contingent rights were subject to forfeiture before they mature. This, needless to say, puts them exactly where al-Qar¨fÂ wants them, since it breaks the necessity of a strict application of the premature-forfeiture rule. In the end, al-Qar¨fÂ is able to achieve victory on both the legal and the psychological fronts. Psychologically, he is able to draw his male colleagues into identifying with his line of legal reasoning. Legally, he is able to establish the propriety of this reasoning by linking it to unimpeachable authorities within the M¨likÂ school.
4.ÊÊRemarried Mothers and the Sequential Order of Custodians
Following his treatment of the thirty examples he cites, al-Qar¨fÂ moves on to the second doctrinal obstacle in the M¨likÂ school, namely, the rule that divorced or widowed women forfeit their right to custody upon entering into a new marriage. Here again, al-Qar¨fÂ accepts the rule, but goes on to argue that it does not give the husbands in question the right they claim. His discussion here is, again, interesting for the light it possibly sheds on the social situation in tenth/sixteenth century Cairo. It suggests that with regard to certain aspects of child-custody, popular notions of propriety contrasted sharply with universally agreed-upon (mujma® ®alayh) rules of law.
As indicated above, the standard position in the M¨likÂ school is that while mothers are first in line among those who have a right to custody, they are not succeeded in this position by fathers. Rather, if a mother dies, becomes unqualified, or remarries, custody passes to her mother. From here it passes to her grandmother, her great grandmother, her sister, the childÕs paternal grandmother, and only then the father! This was the sequence endorsed by M¨lik in the Mudawwanah. Later M¨likÂ law modified this order only to the extent of placing additional female intermediaries between the child and the father. No one in the school had ever held that the father comes immediately after the mother. In the present context, this had two important implications. First, even if the mother is disqualified by reason of remarriage, the right to custody does not pass to the father. Second, the maximum a father can bargain away through any custody agreement is his own right to custody. The right of those prior to him (though after the mother) in succession are not affected by his agreement. In other words, even if his right to revoke his initial agreement is recognized, this does not deliver the child into his custody. 62 It is interesting that during the course of this discussion al-Qar¨fÂ intimates that there is a fair amount of ignorance among women-and men-regarding the sequence of child-custodians. Widows and divorced mothers routinely fall victim to the assumption that their remarriage gives their ex-husbands the right to custody. AlQar¨fÂ sets out to reverse this error by arguing that ignorance in these instances is a valid excuse and that the grandmother, or whoever else is next in line, has the right to come forth and demand custody of the child. 63 
5.ÊÊCustom and Judicial Practice Dispositive
Having successfully dissected the two main doctrinal obstacles in the M¨likÂ school, al-Qar¨fÂ is now ready to reassemble the various bits and pieces of the madhhab into a new conclusion. The glue with which his new synthesis is to be held together is legally sanctioned local custom and judicial practice. These are the object of his discussion in the final segment of Kit¨b al-ib¨nah. Again, al-Qar¨fÂÕs manner of proceeding clearly reflects the strictures imposed upon him as a jurist operating under the r gime of taqlÂd. Rather than risk losing his audience by stating directly that the position of his opponents on premature forfeiture is wrong, al-Qar¨fÂ simply sets out to establish his view as a viable alternative, which, when considered in the light of additional probative evidence, deserves to be given precedence in the present dispute. Having created a psychological space in the minds of his opponents through his masterful dissection of the claimed mashhâr, al-Qar¨fÂ can now insert his new conclusion and secure it through careful appeals to local custom and judicial precedents established by several prominent authorities in the M¨likÂ school. In the end, he is able to champion his interpretation of the rule governing premature forfeiture of contingent rights without giving the appearance of having violated in any way the doctrine of his school.
Al-Qar¨fÂ argues that whenever there is a standing controversy within the school, it is legitimate to rely upon judicial practice as the deciding factor. Even where one of the competing views is accepted as the mashhâr, judicial practice (®amal) may be legitimately relied upon 62 ÊÊÊThere was apparently some minor disagreement within the school on this point. A certain group of ÒQayraw¨nids,Ó for example, held that a motherÕs forfeiture extended to the right of her mother and all who followed the latter, delivering the child into the custody of the father. Ibid., 87.
63 ÊÊÊIbid., 91. to tip the balance in the opposite direction. 64 This is all the more applicable in the present dispute, since the present controversy had been disputed (mukhtalaf fih) in the madhhab, while the normal procedure (®amal) of the (M¨likÂ?) courts in Cairo was to recognize and enforce a fatherÕs premature agreement to forfeit custody. 65 This action by the courts, al-Qar¨fÂ insists, was justified by the fact that a number of authorities, e.g., Abâ Bakr b. al-®ArabÂ (d. 543/1148), Ibn Rushd the Elder and others-presumably in their capacity as judgesoccasionally diverged from the mashhâr, whereupon their views were subsequently adopted and applied by the courts. 66 He ends his discussion by insisting that judicial rulings should always seek to promote the broader interests of the community at large, and, where possible, they should respect legally sanctioned local custom. This view he traces back to his namesake, the great Shih¨b al-DÂn al-Qar¨fÂ, who died in 684/1285.
VII.ÊÊConclusion
Al-Qar¨fÂÕs manner of proceding in Kit¨b al-ib¨nah fÂ ×i½½at isq¨ß ml am yajib min al-½a´¨nah suggests a number of things about the social context in which he operated as a judge and jurist, as well as the state of Islamic legal science during his time. His treatment of the issue of reimbursement for housing expenses and the sequential order of custodians is a clear testimony to the dissonance that existed between the doctrines of the jurists and the reality of the common people. His reliance, meanwhile, on school doctrine as opposed to the Qur¾¨n, Sunnah and u×âl al-fiqh, clearly shows that legal scaffolding, as opposed to ijtih¨d in the proper sense, 67 was the modus operandi of jurists in his time. The ultimate aim behind the crafting of a fatw¨ was not simply to introduce new and innovative ideas but to gain the backing of the school at large. Moreover, al-Qar¨fÂÕs manner of proceeding clearly demonstrates that, unlike modern, secular legislatures that are empowered to rescind and introduce law at will, when faced with new circumstances or rules that no longer serve their originally contemplated function, Muslim jurists were powerless to abolish existing law. Instead they had to look for ways to circumvent it or mitigate its more stultifying effects. 68 This, again, was one of the main functions of taqlÂd-legal scaffolding. Here, however, it should be noted, especially given al-Qar¨fÂÕs position and performance in the present dispute, that the tendency to associate such categories as ÒliberalÓ or ÒprogressiveÓ with ijtih¨d and ÒconservativeÓ or even ÒpatriarchalÓ with taqlÂd is not only unwarranted but dangerously misleading. Finally, it is not always possible to tell, i.e., through a Òcommon-senseÓ or ÒplainÓ reading of a rule, what the outcome of a legal dispute among jurists will be. The present dispute clearly demonstrates how one rule, isq¨ß al-½aabla wujâbih, could be relied upon to yield mutually exclusive conclusions (e.g., between al-Qar¨fÂ and his opponents within the M¨likÂ school). What this suggests is that in addition to sources, principles and precepts, the outcome of legal deliberations are informed by the manner in which these are all invoked and applied. And this application is neither dictated nor governed by the methodology laid out in the books of u×âl al-fiqh or qaw¨®id. There is, in other words, a significant element of legal deliberation that is brought to it from outside the sanctum of legal science proper, namely, the presuppositions, goals, fears and aspirations of individual jurists, which themselves reflect something about the societies in which they live. It is thus not simply logic that governs legal contemplation but exigency and practicality as well. 69 It is not possible at present to tell whether al-Qar¨fÂ was successful in his attempt to retain custody for the divorced mothers in the present dispute. Based on subsequent M¨likÂ manuals, his arguments do not appear to have had any permanent effect on school doctrine. His older contemporary, for example, Mu½ammad al-¼aßß¨b (d. 953/1547) clearly indicated (in dealing with the khul®-for-custody controversy) 70 that the mashhâr of the madhhab was that premature forfeiture of contingent rights was not binding. 71 He says that the right to custody does not return to her Òif she forfeits it after it accrues to her,Ó from which it is to be concluded that if she forfeits it before it accrues to her, she
